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From Inherent Value to Incentive Value:
When and Why Pointless Effort Enhances
Consumer Preference
SARA KIM
APARNA A. LABROO
Companies typically use clear fonts and bright pictures in their ads, Web sites,
and product-package designs; place their products on easy-to-reach shelves; and
emphasize ease-of-usage to make their products appear desirable to consumers.
However, we suggest that customers focused on “incentive” value (getting the best
product) may instead see products associated with noninstrumental (pointless)
effort as more desirable. We suggest that because effort is usually required to get
the best outcomes, people looking for the best outcomes also mistakenly presume
effort must imply the best possible outcome. Across five studies, we show that
highlighting incentive value—for instance, by message framing or by measuring
chronic focus or by manipulating situational focus on incentive value—enhances
preference toward outcomes associated with noninstrumental effort. We discuss
the importance of our findings for understanding everyday consumption decisions
and argue for a widespread tendency among individuals wanting the best to infer
value from noninstrumental effort.
Companies typically associate objective ease with theirproducts to make their products appear desirable to con-
sumers. For example, online shopping malls promote user-
friendly Web sites, software companies advertise ease in
learning their software, and diet plans posit how easy it is to
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lose weight. Companies also evoke subjective ease by using
bright, clear, large fonts and pictures in their ads, Web sites,
and package designs; by paying premiums to place their prod-
ucts on central shelves; and by pulling their products forward
rather than pushing them somewhat back on the shelf. Re-
gardless of whether effort is real and objective or merely
sensed and subjective, the dominant assumption among lay-
persons and across disciplines is that effort evokes negative
feelings that make outcomes appear less attainable (more
costly) and less desirable (e.g., poor quality, not enjoyable to
use; Luce, Payne, and Bettman 1999; Payne, Bettman, and
Johnson 1993; Schwarz 2004).
In the current article, we question this assumption and such
practices. The meaning of effort associated with an outcome
is ambiguous, and we propose that this meaning depends on
the lens people adopt to represent value. In particular, we
propose that value can be represented either as inherent value
(how good or bad the outcome is) or as incentive value
(whether the outcome is the best at serving a specific objective
relative to other possibilities). In assessing the inherent value
of an outcome, people consider the extent to which they like
the outcome based on its attributes. In assessing incentive
value, the frame of reference people instead adopt is whether
the outcome is best at serving a specific objective relative to
other alternatives. Existing research supports the idea that the
value of any outcome, which is a positive function of attain-
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FIGURE 1
THEORETICAL MODEL
ability and of desirability of the outcome, can be represented
either in terms of inherent (liking) or incentive (wanting) value
(Berridge 1999; Dai, Brendl, and Ariely 2010; Naqvi, Shiv,
and Bechara 2006; Winkielman and Berridge 2003). For the
most part, these two types of value are positively associated
because liking results in wanting, but the two can become
dissociated when incentive value is highlighted (Frederick et
al. 2009). The meaning of effort and its implication for out-
come attainability and outcome desirability will depend on
whether inherent value or incentive value is considered. To
people considering inherent value, effort, which is affectively
negative (Luce et al. 1999), will signal low attainability (high
cost) and low desirability (e.g., product unfamiliarity, poor
quality; Labroo and Lee 2006) of that outcome. However, to
people considering incentive value—for instance, because of
message framing, because of a person’s chronic assessment
tendency, or because of situational cues—effort will imply
high motivational significance of the outcome (Labroo and
Kim 2009a). Thus, effort will signal high attainability (if I
put in effort, I will get this outcome) and high desirability (if
I put in effort, it must be the best) of the outcome. As a
consequence, all people some of the time and some people
all of the time will systematically infer added value of out-
comes that require an investment of more, not less, effort,
even noninstrumental (pointless) effort. For instance, con-
sumers considering incentive value may infer that the same
product is more valuable because it will require a trip across
town, its photograph in an advertisement is not entirely clear,
or it is somewhat pushed back on a shelf rather than up front.
To summarize, we propose that the lens with which people
construe value colors their interpretation of effort and its im-
plications for attainability and for desirability (but not nec-
essarily the decision weight of either; see fig. 1). We next
discuss our framework. We then present five experiments as
support. Finally, we discuss how our proposition presents a
theoretical shift from consumer and psychological paradigms
that presume that noninstrumental effort reduces value. From
a practical point of view, we speculate that this phenomenon
might underlie all kinds of consumer and social situations,
including the inadequate appreciation for life’s simpler plea-
sures by workaholics. Given the limited research in this area
despite its importance, we argue for the merits of such re-
search.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Effort and Value
Almost all existing research in marketing and psychology
suggests that ease (vs. effort) is positively related to per-
ceived attainability and to perceived desirability of an out-
come (Bornstein 1989; Schwarz 2004). For example, ex-
isting research suggests that effort associated with making
complicated choices can evoke negative feelings (Botvinick,
Huffstetler, and McGuire 2009; Hedgcock and Rao 2009;
Luce et al. 1999; Thompson, Hamilton, and Petrova 2009).
These negative feelings can be attributed to a high cost of
attaining the outcome (Kivetz and Simonson 2003; Payne
et al. 1993) and to unfamiliarity with, poor quality of, or
unpleasantness of the outcome (Labroo and Lee 2006;
Schwarz 2004), which can reduce product liking and in-
crease choice deferral (Dhar 1997; Iyengar and Lepper
2000). For example, Whittlesea (1993) found that outcomes
associated with effort were judged to be less abundant, and
presumably, as a consequence, more costly to attain. In re-
lated research showing that effort can also make outcomes
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.24 on Thu, 7 Aug 2014 22:54:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
714 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
look undesirable, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that peo-
ple are more likely to defer choice when presented with 24
rather than six variants of jam. Decision overload evoked
negative feelings that were attributed to undesirability of the
jams ( jam attainability was never in question). Thus, ob-
jective effort has been found to make products look less
attainable and less desirable. Also consistent with this idea
that effort is affectively negative and is supposed to make
outcomes appear less desirable, research shows that people
feel a need to justify having expended effort (effort justi-
fication: Kruger et al. 2004; sunk cost effects: Soman 1998;
Staw 1981), and after having expended effort, they justify
choices made with effort as more favorable than those made
without effort (cognitive dissonance: Festinger 1957). Effort
expended on a prior task is even used as justification for
engaging in a current task when the two tasks are seen as
related. For instance, Tsai and McGill (2011) found that
abstract thinkers (who are likely to see tasks as related) are
more confident in a current task after expending effort on
an earlier task (e.g., listing seven reasons vs. one reason for
doing it) and that the extent to which the initial task is rated
as effortful (and thus requiring justification) mediates con-
fidence on the subsequent task.
Not only is objective effort affectively negative and to be
minimized before and during exertion, as well as to be jus-
tified after exertion (sunk cost effect), but even subjective
effort that arises from factors associated with merely thinking
about the product, such as the effort necessary to process its
features (e.g., blurriness of the features: Schwarz 2004), re-
duces liking of a product (Labroo, Dhar, and Schwarz 2008;
Lee and Labroo 2004; Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz 1998;
Zajonc 1968). For example, Alter and Oppenheimer (2006)
showed in a field study that stocks with fluent names do better
in the short run. Short-run returns are defined as smaller,
sooner-attainable rewards versus larger, later-attainable re-
wards, so presumably processing ease increased perceived
attainability of returns. Additionally, in a meta-analysis of
over 200 experiments, Bornstein (1989) showed that subjec-
tive feelings of ease, arising from any of a variety of
sources—such as stimulus clarity, stimulus repetition, stim-
ulus-background contrast, or priming—and applied to any of
a variety of outcomes—assessing art, faces, animals such as
dogs and fish, food, music, alphabets, and products—made
those outcomes appear more desirable (also see Schwarz
2004). Thus, subjective ease can make products look more
attainable and also more desirable. Related research addi-
tionally shows that products that feel subjectively easy to
justify are considered more desirable and tend to be chosen
more often (Sela, Berger, and Liu 2009; Simonson 1989) and
that effort needed to think of more rather than few reasons
to use a product can make the product feel less pleasant to
use (Wa¨nke, Bohner, and Jurkowitsch 1997).
However, other research is now instead beginning to rec-
ognize a positive relationship between value and effort, in-
cluding anticipated or ongoing effort. Indeed, Brin˜ol, Petty, and
Tormala (2006) suggest that the impact of effort on evaluation
should depend on the meaning people are overtly directed to
assign to effort. For example, if people are told that unintelligent
people like ease, outcomes associated with ease are judged less
favorably. Labroo and Kim (2009a, 2009b) further demon-
strated a first instance of one condition when effort is likely to
spontaneously (without any explicit instructions being pro-
vided) take on a positive meaning with regard to value. Building
on self-perception theory, which argues that people often infer
their preferences from their actions (Bem 1967, 1972), Labroo
and Kim (2009a) proposed that, because people usually put
maximum effort into those means that are most effective for
goal pursuit, a correlation exists in their minds between effort
and effectiveness of a means for goal attainment. When trying
to achieve a goal, people mistakenly reverse this correlation
and, as a result, even noninstrumental effort signals that the
product under consideration will best satisfy the accessible goal.
Thus, to people who are in pursuit of important goals, “point-
less” effort associated with an outcome can enhance the per-
ceived value of the outcome by making it appear more instru-
mental for goal pursuit. In related research, Schrift, Netzer, and
Kivetz (2011) show that individuals infer value from needless
effort and complicate important choices, and Sela and Berger
(2011) show that people also complicate unimportant choices.
Labroo, Lambotte, and Zhang (2009) further suggest that
noninstrumental effort signals value when people are as-
sessing the uniqueness of information (see Galak and Nelson
[2011] for similar arguments), and Pocheptsova, Labroo,
and Dhar (2011) report that subjective effort can make spe-
cial-occasion products appear more special. Using the case
of instrumental effort, the exertion of which could actually
result in better value, Kivetz and Simonson (2003) addi-
tionally show that people with an advantage relative to oth-
ers in attaining an outcome infer that the outcome is more
valuable when effort is needed to attain that outcome. Lo,
Lynch, and Staelin (2007) show similar effects for even
consumers facing a disadvantage relative to other consum-
ers, provided those consumers are incentivized to buy the
product.
Inherent Value versus Incentive Value
So how might these two sets of findings, one arguing that
effort reduces value and the other that effort increases value,
be reconciled? One perspective could be that less abundant
outcomes are more desirable (i.e., scarcity heuristic, desir-
ability p f [attainability]; Dai, Wertenbroch, and Brendl
2008). Effort signals low attainability (i.e., high cost; at-
tainability p f [effort]), and this low attainability in turn
signals high desirability (i.e., desirability p f [effort]).
Value is a positive function of attainability and desirability
(value p f [attainability, desirability]); thus, the impact
of effort on value depends on whichever of the two aspects
of value a person assigns greater weight to (Tsai and McGill
2011). As a consequence, attainability-focused people report
reduced value of the outcome because effort reduces per-
ceived attainability, but desirability-focused people report
increased value because effort increases perceived desira-
bility.
However, this presumption is problematic for several rea-
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sons. Most importantly, it fails to account for at least 200
experiments that instead establish that ease (and not just
effort) is positively linked to desirability (i.e., desirabilityp
f [effort]; Bornstein 1989; Schwarz 2004). Many of those
experiments employ stimuli such as abstract line drawings,
abstract art, or animals such as fish, and it is questionable
what attainability means in those contexts. Those experi-
ments instead show that ease is affectively positive (Lee and
Labroo 2004; Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001), and the
positive affect arising from ease is attributed to the desir-
ability of such decision targets (Schwarz 2004). The prop-
osition also does not account for evidence that suggests that
effort can relate positively to attainability (attainability p
f [effort) and not just negatively to it as presumed. For
example, highly motivated people boost effort in the face
of difficulty to motivate persistence toward the outcome
(e.g., if I put in effort, I will get it; Taylor and Brown 1988).
It is also not clear what would cause people to weight either
on attainability or on desirability when a basic assumption
is that the two are negatively correlated and not independent
of each other (the assumption is that effort increases desir-
ability by first signaling low attainability). In sum, the pre-
sumptions that highly attainable outcomes are always less
desirable (they are not), that ease always conveys high at-
tainability but low desirability (it does not), and that the
impact of ease on value depends on whichever aspect of
value is weighted more (it cannot) are simply not tenable:
according to the literature, ease is positively and negatively
related to desirability, ease is positively and negatively
linked to attainability, and highly attainable outcomes can
be more or less desirable.
Thus, to reconcile these mixed findings pertaining to the
effect of effort on value, we propose an alternative framework,
derived from recent research that distinguishes between inher-
ent (liking) value and incentive (wanting) value. Inherent value
pertains to whether an outcome feels good or bad, whereas
incentive value is conceptualized in terms of motivational rel-
evance and whether the outcome is best suited relative to others
to fulfill one’s current motivations (Berridge 1999; Dai et al.
2010; Naqvi et al. 2006; Winkielman and Berridge 2003). In
general, liking and wanting map onto each other because liking
usually results in wanting. However, we propose that when the
incentive value of an outcome is highlighted, these two types
of value can become dissociated from each other. For example,
Litt, Khan, and Shiv (2010) show that in some situations, a
failure to attain an outcome can result in more wanting but less
liking for the outcome, and Dai et al. (2010) show that men
demonstrate increased wanting but not increased liking of more
attractive women when they have to work harder to view their
pictures.
We propose that in the vast majority of studies arguing that
ease increases outcome value, it is possible that people were
considering the inherent value of the outcome. Among people
considering inherent value (outcome goodness), positive feel-
ings of ease (Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001) are likely to
make the outcome feel more attainable, familiar, self-relevant,
of high quality, and desirable (Bornstein 1989; Schwarz 2004)
and hence increase value. However, studies showing that effort
is positively associated with value appear to implicate incentive
value: consumers are considering whether the outcome is the
best possible relative to other means that satisfy a specific goal
(Labroo and Kim 2009a), best specific relative to what others
might attain (Kivetz and Simonson 2003; Lo et al. 2007), or
the most novel and best serving a specific special occasion
(Labroo et al. 2009; Pocheptsova et al. 2011). If so, it is possible
that whenever incentive value (wanting the best) is highlighted,
as might happen when decision framing makes a person con-
sider whether the outcome is best for one’s specific needs, when
people chronically think of themselves as deserving of the best
outcomes, or because situational cues prompt them to think in
such a manner, both attainability and desirability could become
positively associated with effort. In incentive terms, effort sug-
gests that the outcome is the best and the most desirable, and
a sense of ongoing effort makes motivated people more opti-
mistic about the possibility of attaining the outcome.
The Current Research
To summarize, we propose that effort is a positive cue to
people considering incentive value (whether the outcome is
among the best possible) but that it is a negative cue in
general to people who may be considering inherent value
(whether the outcome is any good). Some research indeed
shows that, for the most part, people appear to consider how
much they like a product without sufficient consideration
to whether the option best serves their motivations relative
to other possibilities (Frederick et al. 2009). Across five
experiments, we show that when incentive value (wanting
the best outcomes) is highlighted to consumers—by mes-
sage framing focused on wanting the best product (exper-
iment 1), because of a chronic tendency to focus on incentive
value (experiments 2A and 2B), or because of situational
cues known to make people want the best outcomes (ex-
periments 3 and 4)—they prefer outcomes associated with
effort (vs. ease). We show that our framework holds when
consumers anticipate objective (physical) effort (experi-
ments 1 and 4) and when we employ subjective effort (a
clear vs. blurry ad/product mock up; experiments 2A, 2B,
and 3). Our framework applies to the social domain (rela-
tionship partners), the consumer domain (product choice),
consumption planning (which store has a better product),
and doing social good (making donations). Furthermore, our
framework holds regardless of how incentive value is
highlighted—more overtly and directly through message
framing (experiment 1) or manipulated or measured in a
subtle manner (experiments 2A, 2B, 3, and 4).
EXPERIMENT 1: PLANNING ON GOING
THE EXTRA MILE(S)
Experiment 1 employed a 2 (value focus: inherent vs. in-
centive) # 2 (objective effort: low vs. high) between-sub-
jects design in which participants evaluated a bottle of wine.
Fifty-one city residents read a scenario (see fig. A1 in app.
A) in which they were searching for the best possible bottle
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TABLE 1
THE EFFECT OF FOCUS AND EFFORT ON PREFERENCES: SUMMARY RESULTS
High control (incentive focus) Low control (inherent focus)
Ease Effort Effort  source Ease Effort Effort  source
Study 1 (n p 51):
Evaluation of wine 4.64
(.28)
5.72
(.28)
6.07
(.25)
5.14
(.28)
Study 2A (n p 66):
Evaluation of woman 3.50 4.07 4.14 3.61
Study 2B (n p 80):
Evaluation of cereal 4.95 5.96 5.61 4.64
Study 3 (n p 60):
Cookie evaluation 3.52
(.26)
5.36
(.29)
5.37
(.27)
3.75
(.26)
Cookie attainability 3.47
(.29)
4.15
(.32)
3.90
(.30)
2.19
(.29)
Cookie superiority 3.79
(.30)
4.92
(.33)
4.64
(.31)
4.23
(.30)
Study 4 (n p 74):
Donation rate (n p 74) .5385
(.12)
.9231
(.12)
.5833
(.13)
.7692
(.12)
.5833
(.13)
.7273
(.13)
Donation cents (n p 51) 46.43
(10.80)
83.33
(8.30)
67.86
(10.80)
77.50
(9.10)
42.86
(10.80)
65.63
(10.10)
Charity evaluation (n p 74) 4.23
(.30)
6.15
(.30)
4.58
(.31)
5.69
(.30)
3.63
(.31)
5.68
(.33)
NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
of wine. To highlight incentive value (getting the best wine),
roughly half of the participants were told they were con-
sidering whether the wine truly would be among the best
and worthy of going to the store for. To the remainder of
the participants, we suggested that they were already sure
the wine was exceptional and likely to be their chosen one,
thereby removing the necessity to further consider whether
it is the best possible. Next, to manipulate effort, roughly
half of the participants read that the store was down the
road (ease), and the rest read that it was halfway across town
(effort). After reading the scenario, participants evaluated
the wine (like, favorable, likely to buy; 1p not at all, 7p
very; ap 0.81), completed effort manipulation checks (Go-
ing to the store is effortful, bothersome; 1 p not at all, 7
p very; ap 0.81), value framing manipulation-checks (My
focus is on . . . ; 1 p how it will feel to get this wine, 7
p getting the best wine), interspersed between control mea-
sures (I am the kind of person who usually buys exceptional
gifts for others; 1 p not at all, 7 p very much; attention
to the task: 1 p little attention, 7 p a lot of attention;
mood: 1 p feel bad, 7 p feel good). We expected that
people assessing whether the wine was the best possible
(incentive value) would evaluate the wine more favorably
in a distant (vs. close) store. People no longer assessing if
the wine is the best possible would instead be more attuned
to the affective aspects of value and effort, evaluating the
wine less favorably in a distant (vs. close) store.
A 2 (focus) # 2 (effort) ANOVA on the effort manip-
ulation check revealed the expected main effect of effort
(Mfar p 4.17, Mclose p 2.25; F(1, 47) p 25.74, p ! .01;
other F’s ! 1). Also, a 2 # 2 ANOVA on the focus ma-
nipulation check revealed the expected main effect of focus
(Mincentivep 5.06, Minherentp 4.17; F(1, 47)p 4.29, p ! .05;
other F’s ! 1). No significant effects were observed on any
of the control variables (general gift purchasing tendency,
mood, and attention; F’s ! 1). However, a 2 (focus) # 2
(effort) ANOVA on wine evaluation, our key dependent
variable, revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 47) p
13.18, p ! .01; see table 1). Inherent-value-focused partic-
ipants evaluated the wine more favorably when effort was
low (Mclose p 6.07, Mfar p 5.14; t(47) p 2.43, p ! .05),
but incentive-focused participants evaluated the wine more
favorably when effort was high (Mfarp 5.72, Mclosep 4.64;
t(47)p 2.70, pp .01). Thus, consumers evaluate products
they can get easily more favorably when value is construed
as liking but less favorably when value is construed as get-
ting the best. Notably, the product was identical in both
cases, and we manipulated the value focus of the consumer.
Readers may wonder whether the mediating effect of per-
ceived effort on evaluation is moderated by value focus.
(See app. B.) Employing exact regression procedures used
by Tsai and McGill (2011), we found an effect of objective
effort on perceived effort (b51p 0.98, SEp 0.19; t(47)p
5.16, p ! .01) and an effect of objective effort # focus on
evaluation (b43 p 0.50, SE p 0.14; t(47)p 3.63, p ! .01)
in the basic model. When perceived effort was included to
run an overall model, the effect of objective effort on eval-
uation decreased in significance (b63 p 0.27, SE p 0.18;
t(45) p 1.49, p 1 .14), and instead the effect of perceived
effort # focus on evaluation was significant (b65 p 0.10,
SE p 0.05; t(45) p 1.86, p p .06; Sobel z p 1.75, p p
.05). This mediation suggests that value framing moderates
whether effort exerts a positive or negative impact on value.
However, as with any mediation analysis that is based using
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a manipulation check of the independent variable as me-
diator, this moderated mediation should be interpreted with
caution. This analysis does establish that the perceived effort
underlies the effect of distance on evaluation rather than
something else that distance could be manipulating (e.g.,
construal, beliefs about store quality). However, it does not
provide any process evidence as to whether the value frame
affected the nature of the inference pertaining to the level
of attainability versus superiority (whether this outcome is
the best) that people might make. We test the nature of
inference as underlying process in experiments 3 and 4. A
second concern with this analysis is that it opens up the
possibility that the results are explained by effort justifi-
cation; that is, it is plausible that people planning to expend
effort might infer that they must be expending effort because
the wine is best. Our results, if anything, offer evidence
opposite to such a claim. First, people focused on inherent
value are the ones committed to wine purchase, but people
focused on incentive value were still considering whether
to commit to a purchase. Thus, if anything, those who had
committed should have at least as much if not more need
to justify effort they know they will be expending (they did
not) compared to those who are still considering whether
to commit to purchase (incentive focus). Second, these re-
sults only held using unconventional mediation procedures
employing manipulated variables in the interaction term of
the basic model but measured variables in the interaction
terms of the full model, per Tsai and McGill (2011), which
we do not recommend.
An implication of these findings is that marketers should
not always make their products easily available to consumers
and that consumers might sometimes infer value from a
challenge of having to exert effort to get the product. The
data also suggest that marketers whose products require the
consumer to exert effort should focus their consumers on
why the product is among the best over easily accessible
products in the market. One way marketers can do so is to
directly manipulate consumer focus, just as we did in ex-
periment 1. Another way is to find consumer segments that
might have chronic focus on incentive value. One such
group, we propose, may be people who believe they have
high outcome controllability, defined as a real or illusory
belief in one’s ability to influence one’s outcomes (Bandura
1977). Low control is shown to result in affective concerns
pertaining to whether an outcome is attainable and is any
good (Bandura 1977; Langer 1975, 313), which are likely
to correspond with liking. Instead, high control appears to
result in a focus on incentive value: it enhances a sense of
entitlement and thinking of oneself as above average and
more deserving than others of the best outcomes (Ehrlinger
and Dunning 2003; Gollwitzer and Kinney 1989; Kruger
and Dunning 1999; Taylor and Brown 1988). Thus, to test
our proposition that high outcome control increases incen-
tive focus and thus such individuals will likely evaluate
outcomes associated with effort more favorably, in exper-
iments 2A and 2B we measure outcome controllability and
in experiments 3 and 4 we manipulate it.
EXPERIMENT 2A: SMOOTH TALKER
OR SHY GAWKER?
To test our theory that people who are chronically focused
on incentive value (getting the best outcome) perceive the
very same outcome more favorably if it involves nonin-
strumental effort, we investigated whether those unattached
heterosexual males who think of themselves as deserving
of the best girl end up with more positive attitudes toward
the very same woman if they feel a subjective sense of effort
while evaluating her. For instance, might such men judge a
woman as more desirable if they exert token effort and strain
their eyes to see her, as they might when looking at a picture
that is matted rather than glossy, or in sepia rather than
color, or because she is standing across the room rather than
next to them?
Sixty-six single heterosexual males completed this ex-
periment on the computer. They first indicated their per-
ceived control over “getting the girl” in a social interaction,
using a seven-item Flirting Superiority Scale (FSS) we de-
veloped (see fig. A2 in app. A; a p .88; from Communi-
cative Adaptability Scale [CAS], Duran [1992]). The mea-
sures tap into a person’s belief that he is in control of and
can influence his flirting outcomes to get the best ones pos-
sible. Past research suggests that high outcome controlla-
bility could be an effective manipulation of incentive focus
(entitlement toward getting the best outcomes; Taylor and
Brown 1988). A pretest (n p 27) confirmed that high-FSS
participants derive value from getting the best outcome
(When talking with a woman, I consider whether . . . ; 0
p she is nice, 1p she is the best; M50%p 71.4%, M50%
p 15.4%, b p 1.39, SE p 0.55; x2(1) p 6.26, p p .01).
As control measures, participants also provided measures of
self-esteem (a p .82) and of general communication com-
petence (a p .76).
Next, participants were presented with the picture of a
woman, which was either clear (ease condition) or blurred
by a small percentage (effort condition; see fig. A3 in app.
A), and they were asked to provide their attitudes toward
the woman (attractive, favorable, good; a p .70; 1 p not
at all, 7 p very). As an effort manipulation check, partic-
ipants indicated how effortful it was to process the picture
(1 p clear, easy; 7 p blurry, difficult to judge; rp 0.62).
Studies show that subjective effort manipulated in this man-
ner is attributed to whatever decision a person is making at
the moment (Brin˜ol et al. 2006); thus, in our experiment,
effort should be interpreted in line with a participant’s value
focus. As an additional control measure, participants were
shown the picture of a man that was also either clear or
blurry and were asked to evaluate the man (attractive, fa-
vorable, good; ap .81; 1p not at all, 7p very). Notably,
high-FSS participants (heterosexual males) should not as-
sociate incentive value with such a target and thus should
evaluate the male target based on whether or not they like
the person. Finally, we collected reports of mood (1p bad,
7 p good), arousal (1 p depressed, 7 p excited), and
attention (1 p little, 7 p a lot).
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Results
Regression analysis conducted on the effort manipulation
check measures with picture type, FSS, and their interaction
as independent variables revealed only the expected main
effect of picture type (Mblurry p 4.19; Mclear p 3.29; b p
.44, SE p .14; t(62) p 3.13, p ! .01). Regression
analyses on each of the control variables (attitude toward
the man, general communication competence, self-esteem,
mood, arousal, and attention) with picture type, FSS, and
their interaction as independent variables revealed no sig-
nificant effects (all p’s 1 .20), except for self-esteem, which
was positively correlated with FSS (b p .35, SE p .11;
t(62) p 3.34, p ! .01), and general communication com-
petence, which was also positively correlated with FSS (b
p .30, SE p .08; t(62) p 3.85, p ! .01), but both self-
esteem and communication competence do not predict our
dependent variable, attitudes toward the woman (all p’s 1
.70).
Hypothesis Testing
Regression analysis on attitude toward the woman with
picture type, FSS, and their interaction as independent var-
iables revealed only the predicted interaction (b p .23,
SE p .09; t(62) p 2.63, p ! .01; see table 1). Spotlight
analysis showed that participants with low FSS (1 SD)
had more favorable attitudes when the picture was clear
(Mclear p 4.14; Mblurry p 3.61; t(62) p 1.81, p ! .05), but
those with high FSS (1 SD) had more positive attitudes
when the picture was blurry (Mblurry p 4.07; Mclear p 3.50;
t (62) p 1.94, p ! .05). Note that normatively a blurry
picture is worse than a clear one, but ironically males re-
porting higher flirting skill desired the same woman more
when they saw a worse picture of her.
EXPERIMENT 2B: THE SHOPPER
SUPERIORITY PARADOX
To investigate whether subjective effort increases evaluation
of products among consumers who think of themselves as
superior shoppers (getting the best products), we conducted
a field study with 80 residents in a downtown area. First,
we asked each respondent to look at and evaluate either a
clear or a blurry product mock-up of 365 Cereal Bar (Whole
Foods Brand; see fig. A3 in app. A), presumably a new
product in the market (favorable, likable, likely to buy; 1p
not at all, 7 p very; a p .87). They also indicated their
mood (1 p bad, 7 p good), arousal (1 p unexcited, 7 p
excited), and attention (1 p paid little, 7 p paid a lot of).
Finally, we measured each respondent’s perceived shopping
skill (see fig. A2 in app. A; ap .71; Shopping Superiority
Scale [SSS] based on Mallalieu and Palan [2006]). Regres-
sion on each of the controls (mood, arousal, and attention)
with mock-up, SSS, and their interaction as independent
variables revealed no effects (p’s 1 .20). A pretest confirmed
that the focus of high-SSS consumers (n p 33) is on in-
centive value (When buying products, I focus on . . . ; 0
p familiar likeable products, 1 p only the best; M50% p
53.0%, M50% p 37.5%; b p 0.75, SE p 0.40; x2(1) p
3.39, p p .05).
Regression analysis on attitude toward 365 Cereal Bar
with mock-up type, SSS, and their interaction as indepen-
dent variables revealed the predicted interaction (bp.46,
SE p .13; t(76) p 3.63, p ! .01; see table 1). Spotlight
analysis showed that participants with low SSS (1 SD)
evaluated the cereal bars more favorably when they saw the
clear mock-up (Mclear p 5.61, Mblurryp 4.64; t(76)p 2.34,
p ! .05), but participants with high SSS (1 SD) evaluated
the cereal bars more favorably when the mock-up was blurry
(Mblurry p 5.96, Mclear p 4.95; t(76) p 2.48, p ! .01).
Note that the effort was token and not real: we created it
by altering the subjective processing experiences associated
with the product mock-up. Marketers presumably can as-
sociate effort with their products by the use of pastel rather
than bright colors or by placing the product high up or
somewhat back on a shelf rather than at eye level. Ironically,
by creating such challenges in a shopping experience, we
expect that marketers can increase sales among shoppers
who feel in control of their shopping experience. Less sur-
prisingly, the reverse is likely to be true of shoppers who
are overwhelmed by their shopping experience.
Experiment 1 directly manipulated focus on incentive
value to investigate peoples’ preferences for products as-
sociated with real effort (vs. ease). Experiments 2A and
2B measured chronic controllability, which is known to
evoke focus on getting the best outcomes (incentive value),
and they found results similar to those observed in ex-
periment 1. People who feel deserving of the best out-
comes, for instance, because they are early adopters (pi-
oneers) or trendsetters, might be naturally more inclined
to have their focus on best outcomes (and see value in
products associated with noninstrumental effort). In ex-
periment 3, we replicate the findings of experiments 2A
and 2B but instead manipulate value focus using an illu-
sory control manipulation (Langer 1975), known to result
in entitlement and deservingness of the best outcomes
(Gollwitzer and Kinney 1989; Kruger and Dunning 1999;
Taylor and Brown 1988), which may correspond with focus
on incentive value (wanting the best outcomes).
EXPERIMENT 3: ILLUSIONS OF A
COOKIE MONSTER
Experiment 3 employed a 2 (value focus: inherent vs. in-
centive) # 2 (objective effort: low vs. high) between-sub-
jects design in which a box of assorted cookies served as
the target product. Sixty undergraduate students participated
for compensation. Value focus was operationalized by an
illusory control manipulation and effort was operationalized
by a perceptual illusion. Upon arrival at the lab, we seated
each participant individually at a rectangular table. In ad-
vance, we placed a box of cookies on the table 3 feet away
from where the participant would sit.
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Focus Manipulation
At the start of the experiment, each participant received
a lottery ticket that would determine whether he would get
the box of cookies in front of him. Adapting classic ma-
nipulations showing that people believe they have higher
control over obtaining a positive outcome when they roll a
die than when an experimenter rolls the die (Langer 1975),
and based on the finding that high control results in enhanced
sense of deservingness and entitlement of the best outcomes
(Kruger and Dunning 1999; Taylor and Brown 1988), and
based on the observation that some (but not all) real-world
lotteries allow participants to choose their numbers, which
we proposed might focus participants on incentive value,
we asked half of the participants to include their winning
number on the ticket (incentive value focus). The remaining
participants received a number already on the ticket (base-
line/low control). Manipulating this factor might be in a
marketer’s control; for instance, in his advertising, a mar-
keter could cue consumers to think about their own versus
the marketer’s actions that affect choices. Presumably, con-
sumer focus on own actions would result in higher outcome
control. A pretest (n p 30) confirmed that writing one’s
own lottery number shifts focus to wanting the best out-
comes (I value . . . ; 0 p cookies I like, 1p cookies that
are exceptional; Mhigh p 64.3%, Mlow p 31.3%; x2(1) p
3.28, p p .05).
Effort Manipulation
To associate effort with the box of cookies, we created a
perceptual illusion. In the high-effort condition, experi-
menters placed a dull white screen (that blended with the
color of the box of cookies) directly behind the box of
cookies. The screen essentially truncated the table and made
the box appear to be at the far end of the table. In contrast,
in the low-effort condition, experimenters placed the screen
3 feet behind the box of cookies toward the end of the table.
This placement made the box appear to be in the middle of
the table and visually closer to the participant. We used this
manipulation in order to replicate the kinds of product shelv-
ing situations a consumer might face. In sum, although the
physical distance between the participant and the box of
cookies was constant across conditions (3 feet), by placing
the screen either directly behind or 3 feet behind the cookies,
we manipulated a perception of effort associated with the
box of cookies. A pilot (np 22) confirmed the link between
effort and the position of the screen (the cookies appear: 1
p easy to process, 7 p effortful to process; Mfront p 4.75
vs. Mend_table p 3.90; t(20) p 2.45, p ! .05).
Dependent Variables
Next, each participant received a survey questionnaire.
First, to measure perceived level of attainability of the cook-
ies, each participant indicated his confidence in winning the
cookies (1 p not at all confident, unlikely, 7 p very con-
fident, likely to win cookies; a p 0.91). To measure per-
ceived level of superiority (desirability) of the cookies, each
participant indicated taste and product superiority (1 p
seems inferior tasting, are not the best, will not make me
feel good; 7 p seems superior tasting, are the best quality,
will make me feel good; ap 0.71). Finally, each participant
evaluated the cookies (favorable, likable, positive; 1p not
at all, 7 p very; a p 0.91; attitude measures counterbal-
anced with attainability/superiority measures and were al-
ways on consecutive pages; no order effects were observed).
To test for alternative underlying processes and to rule
against self-generated validity effects, participants indicated
the importance of indulgence goals (e.g., to control for a
possibility that effort reduced value of indulgence; 1 p
Feeling good is less important than self-control, 7p Feeling
good is more important than self-control), their attitude to-
ward cookies in general (In general, I like cookies; 1 p
disagree, 7 p agree), attention paid to the task (e.g., to
control for an alternative account that subjective effort in-
creased involvement; 1 p little attention, 7 p a lot of
attention), current mood (e.g., to control for an alternative
account that subjective ease induced positive mood; 1 p
bad, 7p good), and arousal (1p unexcited, 7p excited).
Results
The 2 (focus) # 2 (effort) ANOVAs on each of the
control measures (importance of indulgence goals, general
liking of cookies, self-reported attention to the task, self-
reported mood, and self-reported arousal) revealed no sig-
nificant effects (all p’s 1 .20; see table 2 for means).
Hypothesis Testing. A 2 (focus) # 2 (effort) between-
subjects ANOVA on attitude toward the cookies only re-
vealed a significant interaction (F(1, 56) p 39.71, p ! .01;
see fig. 2 and table 1). As expected, low-control (baseline)
participants who were assigned a lottery number preferred
the cookies associated with ease (Mease p 5.37, Meffort p
3.75; t(56) p 4.27, p ! .01), but high-control (incentive
focus) participants preferred the cookies associated with ef-
fort (Mease p 3.52, Meffort p 5.36; t(56) p 4.64, p ! .01).
Cookie Attainability. A 2 (focus) # 2 (effort) ANOVA
on an index created by averaging the two attainability items
revealed a main effect of control (F(1, 56)p 6.60, p ! .01);
those who indicated their own lottery number thought the
cookies were more attainable (M p 3.81) than did those
who were assigned a number (M p 3.04). The main effect
of effort was marginal (F(1, 56) p 2.96, p ! .10); cookies
were perceived as more attainable when close (M p 3.68)
versus far (Mp 3.17). Importantly, a significant interaction
between focus and effort (F(1, 56) p 16.09, p ! .01; see
fig. 2) qualified these main effects. For low-control (base-
line) participants, effort reduced perceived level of cookie
attainability (Mease p 3.90, Meffort p 2.19; t(56) p 4.13, p
! .01), as one might expect. In contrast, among high-control
(incentive focus) participants, effort had a (nonsignificant)
tendency to increase perceived level of cookie attainability
(Mease p 3.47, Meffort p 4.15; t(56) p 1.59, p 1 .12).
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TABLE 2
EFFECT OF FOCUS AND EFFORT ON CONTROL VARIABLES: SUMMARY RESULTS
High control (incentive focus) Low control (inherent focus)
Ease Effort Effort  source Ease Effort Effort  source
Study 3 (n p 60):
Importance of indulgence goals 3.63
(.34)
3.23
(.37)
3.53
(.35)
3.44
(.34)
General liking of cookies 4.44
(.38)
4.69
(.41)
5.27
(.39)
4.56
(.38)
Self-reported attention 3.56
(.43)
4.15
(.47)
4.13
(.45)
3.44
(.43)
Self-reported mood 4.75
(.27)
4.77
(.30)
4.47
(.28)
4.69
(.27)
Self-reported arousal 4.44
(.25)
4.31
(.28)
4.27
(.26)
4.40
(.25)
Study 4 (n p 74):
Importance of be-kind goals 6.15
(.33)
5.77
(.33)
5.58
(.34)
6.08
(.33)
5.67
(.34)
6.36
(.36)
General tendency of donation 2.93
(.42)
3.15
(.42)
2.50
(.44)
3.08
(.42)
3.75
(.44)
3.18
(.46)
Attention 5.07
(.36)
5.54
(.36)
4.50
(.37)
5.54
(.36)
4.75
(.37)
4.82
(.39)
Completeness of reading 5.92
(.28)
6.54
(.28)
5.75
(.29)
6.23
(.28)
6.17
(.29)
6.36
(.30)
Self-reported mood 4.08
(.36)
3.77
(.36)
3.42
(.37)
3.38
(.36)
3.92
(.37)
3.82
(.39)
General self-esteem 4.46
(.34)
4.15
(.34)
3.83
(.35)
4.23
(.34)
4.33
(.36)
4.36
(.37)
NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
Cookie Superiority. A 2 (focus) # 2 (effort) ANOVA
on the index created by averaging the three items reflecting
superiority of the cookies revealed only a significant inter-
action (F(1, 56) p 6.11, p ! .05; see fig. 2). Among high-
control (incentive focus) participants, ease reduced per-
ceived cookie superiority (Meffortp 4.92, Measep 3.79; t(56)
p 2.51, p p .01), but among low-control (inherent value
focus) participants, effort had a (nonsignificant) tendency to
reduce perceived cookie superiority (Meffortp 4.23, Measep
4.64; t ! 1).
Mediated Moderation. To test for underlying process
(Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes [2007], model 5, 194), we ran
four simultaneous regressions (see table 3): (1) evaluation
p f(effort, focus, effort# focus), (2) attainability levelp
f(effort, focus, effort # focus), (3) superiority level p f
(effort, focus, effort# focus); and (4) evaluationp f (effort,
focus, effort # focus, attainability level, attainability level
# focus, superiority level, superiority level # focus). In
the results, we observed a significant effect of effort# focus
on evaluation in equation 1 (b p 0.87, SE p 0.14; t(56)
p 6.30, p ! .01), a significant effect of effort # focus on
attainability level in equation 2 (bp 0.60, SEp 0.15; t(56)
p 4.01, p ! .01), a significant effect of effort # focus on
superiority level in equation 3 (bp 0.39, SEp 0.16; t(56)
p 2.47, p ! .05), and significant effects of attainability level
(b p 0.29, SE p 0.10; t(52) p 2.86, p ! .01; Sobel z p
2.33, p ! .01) and superiority level (bp 0.47, SEp 0.10;
t(52)p 4.48, p ! .01; Sobel zp 2.16, p ! .05) but reduced
significance for the effect of effort # focus on evaluation
in equation 4 (b p 0.49, SE p 0.14; t(52) p 3.60, p !
.01). Thus, attainability level and superiority level jointly
mediated the effect of effort# focus on evaluation. (Note:
the INDIRECT command controls for any correlations be-
tween terms and gives an output similar to LISREL when
items are uncorrelated; see apps. C–F.)
This analysis suggests that the focus# effort moderation
effect on evaluation is mediated by the meaning people
assign to effort according to their value focus (see app. C,
figs. C1 and C2, model A). Effort either has a positive effect
on attainability and on superiority or a negative effect on
attainability and on superiority depending on how value is
construed. An interpretation that effort always evokes each
of two inversely related meanings pertaining to level of
attainability and superiority but the weight that people put
on either cue depends on focus (model B) or that the effect
of focus# effort on evaluation depends both on the mean-
ing people assign to effort and a shift in decision weight
according to focus (model C) is not plausible. For these
alternative models/accounts, the two interactions of focus
# attainability level and focus # superiority level would
need to be significant, which they are not (in accordance
with model A).
Conceptual Implications: Does the Evidence Support Two
Representations of Value? Empirically, the data support
model A (see app. C, figs. C1 and C2, models A–C). Con-
ceptually, model A is inconsistent with an assumption that
there is a singular representation of value that is the weighted
sum of perceived attainability and desirability of an outcome
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FIGURE 2
THE EFFECT OF FOCUS (CONTROL) AND EFFORT
ON COOKIE EVALUATION (TOP), ATTAINABILITY LEVEL
(MIDDLE), AND SUPERIORITY LEVEL (BOTTOM):
EXPERIMENT 3
* p ! .05.
(where attainability and desirability are negatively correlated
and a person focuses either on effort as signal of low at-
tainability or of high desirability) because it is unclear how
the meaning of effort could change but not the decision
weight on either meaning. Model A implies that effort has
the same direction of impact on attainability and on desir-
ability (i.e., effort makes both attainability and desirability
more positive or more negative depending on value focus).
Both models B and C allow for the possibility that attain-
ability and superiority could be negatively correlated and
value depends on the meaning of effort a person puts weight
on; thus, only models B and C are consistent with a singular
representation of value, and we did not find support for either
model. One caveat could be that our mediation measures
are better at capturing attribute level rather than decision
weight and therefore we may not have observed changes in
decision weight. In this respect, note that the coefficients in
the regressions are reasonable indicators of decision weight.
Also, any assumption that only effort but not ease is an
indicator of high desirability (which is necessary for a de-
cision weight line of argumentation; models B or C) is at
odds with numerous findings in the literature that show ro-
bust positive effects of ease on desirability (Schwarz 2004).
Those studies associate ease with targets such as nonsense
syllables and suggest that people directly attribute positive
affect from ease to desirability of the target (Bornstein 1989;
Zajonc 1968), and it is unclear what attainability of such
stimuli would mean. If both ease and effort are linked pos-
itively to desirability, there must be two meanings of de-
sirability, and the meaning used should likely depend on the
lens people use to construe value itself.
It therefore follows that the only way in which an inter-
pretation of effort could change without changing decision
weights of attainability or superiority is if effort colors per-
ceived attainability and superiority similarly either in a pos-
itive or a negative direction. Indeed, once we split the data
on controllability, we find that among low-control partici-
pants, effort relates negatively to both attainability (b p
.86, SEp .20) and to superiority (bp .21, SEp .17;
see table 3). Among high-control participants, effort relates
positively to both attainability (b p .34, SE p .22) and
superiority (bp .57, SEp .57). This coloring could happen
either if our measures pick up self-generated validity effects
or if there are two representations of value itself (inherent
vs. incentive) and the lens with which people approach value
is different to begin with. We believe the data support the
latter possibility. Self-generated validity seems less plausible
because (a) attainability and superiority are not correlated,
either for low-control (r p .04, p 1 .80) or for high-
control participants (r p .05, p 1 .75); if one measure was
having an impact on the other, we should have found these
correlations; (b) mediators were collected in close proximity
with control measures (see table 2), which did not show
similar effects; and (c) one could argue that self-generated
validity effects would likely always necessitate a negative
correlation between attainability level and superiority level,
independent of the effect of effort (an assumption that fits
model C best), but our two mediators are uncorrelated with
each other (r p .07, p 1 .50).
Also, model A is most compatible with a view that value
might have two representations. In one representation of
value, effort negatively affects both attainability and desir-
ability, which we believe is likely to occur if an individual
is tuned into inherent value, where the negative affect as-
sociated with effort makes the outcome appear less attain-
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TABLE 3
MEDIATED MODERATION: EXPERIMENT 3
Equation Effort Focus
Effort #
focus Attainability
Attainability #
focus Superiority
Superiority #
focus
Overall analysis:
1. Evaluation .05
(.14)
[.38]
.06
(.14)
[.45]
.87
*(.14)
[6.30]
2. Attainability .26
(.15)
[1.72]
.38**
(.15)
[2.57]
.60*
(.15)
[4.01]
3. Superiority .18
(.16)
[1.14]
.04
(.16)
[.25]
.39*
(.16)
[2.47]
4. Evaluation .11
(.14)
[.84]
.26
(.59)
[.44]
.49**
(.14)
[3.60]
.29**
(.10)
[2.86 ]
.11
(.10)
[1.13]
.47**
(.10)
[4.48]
.01
(.10)
[.05]
Split analysis, inherent focus (low control):
1. Evaluation .81**
(.19)
[4.23]
2. Attainability .86**
(.20)
[4.25]
3. Superiority .21
(.17)
[1.25]
4. Evaluation .62**
(.13)
[4.59]
5. Evaluation .37
(.21)
[1.80]
.40**
(.15)
[2.71]
.47*
(.18)
[2.63]
Split analysis, incentive focus (high control):
1. Evaluation .92**
(.19)
[4.68]
2. Attainability .34
(.22)
[1.54]
3. Superiority .57*
(.27)
[2.09]
4. Evaluation .61**
(.13)
[4.79]
5. Evaluation .60**
(.17)
[3.44]
.17
(.14)
[1.28]
.46**
(.11)
[4.16]
NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses; t-values are in brackets. All equations included constant terms. For overall analysis, n p 60,
Sobel z attainability p 2.33, p ! .01; Sobel z superiority p 2.16, p ! .05. For split analysis, inherent focus (low control), n p 31, Sobel z
attainabilityp 2.28, p ! .05. For split analysis, incentive focus (high control), np 29, Sobel z superiorityp 1.87, pp .06. The overall analysis
reported in this table is per Muller et al. (2005). We jointly included our two mediators because attainability level and superiority level are
uncorrelated (r p .07, p 1 .50). This regression analysis gives output almost identical to simultaneous regression analysis, which runs all
regressions at once. Simultaneous analysis with both mediators conducted using SAS is identical to similar analysis conducted with LISREL
running all mediators and relationships at once. LISREL outputs are reported in appendix D. Running a double mediation analysis per Preacher
and Hayes (2008) using INDIRECT command, in which the effect of effort # focus on evaluation simultaneously includes both mediators
(attainability and superiority level) and includes effort and focus as covariates gives similar results (see app. E). Also, running this analysis with
one mediator at a time does not change our overall results (see app. F).
p ! .10.
*p ! .05.
**p ! .01.
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able and less desirable (low quality, not as good). In the
other representation of value, effort positively affects both
attainability and desirability, which we believe is likely to
occur if an individual is tuned into the incentive aspects of
effort, which, in turn, would occur if effort is seen as mo-
tivationally relevant. We propose here that effort cues value
by making an outcome look the best (superior; Labroo and
Kim 2009a), and when faced with difficulty (e.g., effort),
highly motivated people become more optimistic about their
chances of getting an outcome (attainability) when they
sense ongoing effort. Thus, inherent value will be associated
with a lens in which attainability reflects a consideration of
whether the individual can get the outcome and a consid-
eration of whether the outcome is any good, and effort that
is affectively negative will reduce both aspects of value.
Incentive value will be associated with a lens in which at-
tainability reflects an assumption that if one puts in effort
one will get the outcome and the outcome is best and thus
associating effort with an outcome increases both aspects
of incentive value.
Additional Insights from Meditation Analysis. Interest-
ingly, and not predicted by us, the data show that only at-
tainability level is a mediator of value for low-control par-
ticipants and that only superiority level is a mediator for
high-control participants. Specifically, among low-control
participants, we found a significant negative effect of effort
on evaluation (b p 0.81, SE p 0.19; t(29) p 4.23, p
! .01), a positive effect of attainability level on evaluation
(bp 0.62, SEp 0.13; t(29)p 4.59, p ! .01), a significant
negative effect of effort on attainability level (b p 0.86,
SE p 0.20; t(29) p 4.25, p ! .01), but a nonsignificant
effect of effort on superiority level (bp0.21, SEp 0.17;
t(29) p 1.25, p 1 .20) of the cookies, which means su-
periority level is not a mediator for those with low control.
When we included attainability level of the cookies as a
covariate in the regression measuring the effect of effort on
evaluation of the cookies, the effect of attainability level
was significant (b p 0.40, SE p 0.15; t(27) p 2.71, p !
.01), and the effect of effort on evaluation decreased in
significance (b p 0.37, SE p 0.21; t(28) p 1.80, p !
.10; Sobel z p 2.28, p ! .05). Thus, for low-control par-
ticipants, effort was interpreted as reduced level of attain-
ability and that mediated cookie evaluation.
By contrast, for high-control participants, we found a sig-
nificant positive effect of effort on evaluation (b p 0.92,
SE p 0.19; t(27) p 4.68, p ! .01), a significant effect of
superiority level on evaluation (bp 0.61, SEp 0.13; t(27)
p 4.79, p ! .01), a significant effect of effort on superiority
level (b p 0.57, SE p 0.27; t(27) p 2.09, p ! .05), but a
nonsignificant effect of effort on attainability level (b p
0.34, SE p 0.22; t(27) p 1.54, p 1 .13) of the cookies,
which means that attainability level is not a mediator for
those with high control. When we included superiority level
as a covariate to measure the effect of effort on evaluation,
the effect of superiority level was significant (bp 0.46, SE
p 0.11; t(25) p 4.16, p ! .01), but effort was reduced in
significance (b p 0.60, SE p 0.17; t(25) p 3.44, p ! .01;
Sobel z p 1.87, p p .06). Thus, among high-control par-
ticipants, effort was interpreted in terms of superiority level
and that mediated evaluation.
This differential mediation among low-control and high-
control participants could occur because of at least three
reasons. First, it is possible that, with more statistical power,
we would also observe among high-control participants a
significant impact of effort on attainability and consequently
on value and among low-control participants a significant
impact of effort on superiority and consequently on value.
Second, it is possible that our measures are not sensitive
enough. Our attainability measure may not have been sen-
sitive enough to capture entitlement among high-control par-
ticipants or to capture desirability among low-control par-
ticipants. Third, if the observed patterns are stable, this
analysis would suggest that for high-control participants ef-
fort affects both attainability and superiority perceptions but
extent of perceived superiority influences incentive value.
Although perceived attainability increases because of on-
going effort, among incentive-focused (high-control) peo-
ple, value is mediated by the extent to which effort makes
the outcome look superior. Instead, among low-control par-
ticipants ease makes outcome look more attainable and more
desirable, but value depends on the extent to which the
outcome can be attained. This latter possibility is somewhat
at odds with research showing that ease has a direct effect
on value via desirability (Schwarz 2004), but it is possible
that our measure did not adequately capture desirability.
These aspects of the data offer rich and new theoretical
insights and possibilities for future research. In experiment
4, we test for robustness of these patterns in the data using
another context for investigation.
These findings should not be interpreted to say that focus
will never change decision weight. One reason we did not
find change in decision weight having an impact on value
may be because in our outcome, across conditions, infor-
mation about attainability and superiority was constant and
identical (other than the meaning of effort). Although only
a conjecture, we believe it is possible that, if we had choice
between two options that differed on attainability versus
superiority, then final choice would include changes in de-
cision weight. Also, if we ignore our effort manipulation
(e.g., presume that perceived effort is person specific and
is picked up in the rating of attainability and of superiority)
and create a net superiority index by subtracting the score
on level of attainability from that on the level of superiority,
and model value as a function of controllability, net per-
ceived superiority, and their interaction, we find a significant
effect of controllability # net superiority index on evalu-
ation (b p 0.26, SE p 0.10; t(56)p 2.60, pp .01). This
finding is compatible with views in past research suggesting
that value depends on whether people weight attainability
or superiority more and on the inference they make specific
to the aspect they weight, the other meaning being assigned
a zero weight (e.g., Wilkie and Pessemier 1973). The reality,
of course, appears to be more nuanced, as just described,
and it appears that some past findings that proposed an effect
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on evaluation because of a change in decision weight may
actually have alternatively or additionally been observing
the effect of an interpretation of decision-evoked feelings.
Future researchers should include direct measures of weight
and level in the same study, or manipulate inherent value
versus incentive value directly, and should measure each
item with different participants to ensure against self-gen-
erated validity effects.
EXPERIMENT 4: EXERTING EFFORT TO
MAKE A REAL DONATION
Experiment 4 extends the findings from experiments 1–3 in
several ways. First, experiments 1–3 employed hedonic prod-
ucts whose consumption might need to be justified with effort
(Kivetz and Simonson 2002), and it is possible, though un-
likely, that people with incentive focus (high control) some-
how need to justify guilty consumption more. To ensure gen-
erality of our findings, we employ a donation task in exper-
iment 4 that does not require any justification. Second, we
measure actual behavior (real donation to charity) to observe
real actions of consumers. Third, we test the robustness of
our mediation. Researchers have argued that the error terms
of a dependent variable and of a mediator could always be
correlated because of a third causal factor (Bullock, Green,
and Ha 2010). To ensure against this possibility, researchers
should include a condition that turns off the mediator so that
the mediating effect is no longer observed on the dependent
variable. Thus, we included a condition in which we turn off
inference by directing participants’ attention to the true source
of (noninstrumental) effort. We expect that, when participants
are aware that effort is not a reflection of superiority, they
will no longer interpret effort as a signal of outcome supe-
riority and will unbias their evaluations (Schwarz 2004). Ex-
periment 4 thus used a 2 (value focus: inherent vs. incentive)
# 3 (real noninstrumental effort: low, high, or high source
aware) between-subjects design, with actual money donated
to charity as a dependent variable.
Method
Seventy-four undergraduate students participated for com-
pensation. Upon arrival at the lab, each participant signed a
consent form, learned that he or she would participate in two
studies, and was then seated at a desk in an adjacent room. A
3 inch# 2 inch board comprising information about a charity
(http://www.kidsindanger.org) sat on the desk. This charity is
real, and the materials are incredibly sad; they describe
young children who died due to defective consumer prod-
ucts, including the story of Baby Danny, whose crib crushed
him at his day care facility after he attempted to stand up.
As the cost of attending to these materials is high (Fishbach
and Labroo 2007), justifying a donation to the charity is
unlikely. A metal donation box was attached to the board.
We used two replicates for the focus manipulation. We
assigned each participant to only one of the two manipu-
lations, and within the manipulation, we assigned each to
either the inherent or the incentive value focus condition.
Incentive-focus participants were either told that they were
among the first to participate in the study (suggesting that
they could set the patterns for and influence the rest of the
study and might therefore wish to focus on the best they
could do [Langer 1975]; an inference consumers might
freely make is that they are among the first or last to enter
a store, try a product, or support a cause) or, in an alternative
manipulation, were asked to list three ways in which they
could help children (again something marketers can manip-
ulate in their advertising, and presumably people list three
reasons easily and they list the best ways to do so first).
Inherent-value-focus (low-control) participants were either
told they were among the last to participate in the study,
suggesting that most of the study had been completed and
they could no longer influence it (Langer 1975); or, in an
alternative manipulation, they were asked to list seven ways
in which they could help children. We based this second
manipulation on past literature (Schwarz 2004) that dem-
onstrates that, even though seven ways are objectively more
ways than three to be influential, generating more ways is
difficult, which reduces perceived control, which, in turn,
shifts value focus to inherent value. A pretest (n p 30)
confirmed that being among the first rather than the last to
participate induced incentive focus (My focus is on . . . ;
0 p whether I would like to make a difference in life of
children in danger, 1 p donating only to the best charity;
Mfirst p 71.4%, Mlast p 21.4%; x2(1) p 7.04, p ! .01).
Another pretest (n p 30) confirmed that listing three (vs.
seven) ways induced incentive focus (M3 p 80.0%, M7 p
33.3%; x2(1) p 6.65, p ! .01).
We manipulated anticipated effort with physical distance.
Before each participant arrived in the room, depending on
the effort condition to which the participant was assigned,
we placed the box either close to (2 feet away) or farther
away from (4 feet away) the participant. Participants in the
distant condition would need to stretch out their arms to put
money in the box, exerting real effort; those in the near
condition could easily make a donation if they wanted.
Procedure. After participants were seated, they received
an answer booklet in which to complete the survey. In it,
participants responded to several questions, including de-
mographic variables and whether being good and kind was
important to them (yes/no response; all participants, re-
gardless of value focus [control] replication type [item gen-
eration vs. feedback] or focus condition [inherent vs. in-
centive focus], answered yes to this question). Participants
for whom we manipulated focus through the item-generation
task next listed three (incentive-focus condition) or seven
(inherent-focus condition) ways in which they could help
people. Participants for whom we manipulated focus through
the feedback manipulation were simply thanked after they
had responded to the yes/no question, for either being among
the first (incentive) or last (inherent) to participate in our
study. The two replications of focus yielded similar patterns
of results, and they were collapsed to form a single incentive
(inherent) focus condition.
Once participants completed the survey, experimenters
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told them the study was over and compensated them. Ex-
perimenters explained that the participants would need to
wait 5 minutes for the next study, which was in an adjacent
room. We invited them, in the meantime, to look over ma-
terials publicizing a local charity, to answer a few questions
for which we had agreed to get responses if possible, and
to make an anonymous donation if they wished. All partic-
ipants agreed to look over the materials and answer the
questions while they waited alone in the room. The room
was small, clean, and private, and it contained only the desk,
chair, and donation materials, as well as no two-way mirrors
in order to ensure the participant recognized the donation,
if made, would be anonymous. We manipulated illusory
control (focus) by the first task and manipulated effort by
varying the distance of the donation box from the participant
(near or far). At this time, to make participants in the effort
 source condition aware of the true source of effort, ex-
perimenters explained that “by the way, we placed the box
somewhat far from you.”
In the booklet, participants were first asked to make a
donation if they wished to do so. After this invitation, par-
ticipants provided evaluations of the charity, perceived at-
tainability of impact, perceived superiority of the charity,
and all of the control measures included in experiment 3.
For brevity and because the results perfectly replicate those
of experiment 3, we only discuss the real donation measure
but report all evaluations means and mediation analyses in
tables 1–3.
Results and Discussion
We first tested whether donation rate was affected by
focus (controllability) and donation effort (see table 4). A
binary logistic regression on a score that coded for whether
a participant made a donation (0p no, 1p yes) with value
focus (inherent, incentive), effort (low, high), and their in-
teraction revealed only a significant effect of interaction (b
p 0.80, SE p 0.37; Wald p 4.72, p ! .05). Among in-
centive-focused (high-control) participants, the donation rate
was higher when effort was high (Mclose p 54%, Mfar p
92%; x2(1) p 4.88, p ! .05); when alerted to the source of
effort (distance), the donation rate decreased to become no
different from that of participants in the close condition
(Mfarsource p 58%, p 1 .80). Similar effects did not emerge
for inherent-value (low-control) participants, though dona-
tion rates were in the direction that one might expect (Mclose
p 77%, Mfar p 58%; x2(1) p .99, p ! .30; Mfarsource p
73%, p 1 .80).
We next tested whether donation amount increased
among those who decided to make a donation (n p 51).
A 2 (focus) # 3 (effort) between-subjects ANOVA on
amount donated only revealed a significant interaction
(F(2, 45) p 6.66, p ! .01). As predicted, in the inherent
value (low-control) condition, participants donated less
money when the box was far away (Mclose p 77.50 cents,
Mfar p 42.86 cents, t(45) p 2.45, p ! .01); when alerted
to the source of effort (distance), their donation amount
increased to become no different from that of participants
in the easy (close) condition (Mfarsource p 65.63 cents, t
! 1). This measure, in conjunction with the donation rate
measure, suggests that making a donation by itself is ef-
fortful to inherent-value-focused (low-control) participants,
but if they are willing to make a donation, they donate more
when it is easy to do so. More interestingly, in the incentive
focus (high-control) condition, participants donated more
when the donation box was far away rather than close (Mclose
p 46.43, Mfar p 83.33 cents; t(45) p 2.71, p ! .01), but
when alerted to the source of effort (distance), their donation
amounts became no different from the amounts donated in
the easy (close) condition (Mfarsourcep 67.86 cents; t(45)p
1.39, p 1 .17). Thus, incentive-focused (high-control) par-
ticipants were both more willing to make a donation when
making a donation was effortful, and once they decided to
make a donation, they donated more money when it was
effortful to do so. When effort no longer served as infor-
mation pertaining to the superiority of the charity, donation
rate and donation amount reduced to become no different
from the rate and amount when donation was easy. Impor-
tantly, we observed mediated moderation effects similar to
those in experiment 3 in this experiment (see table 3 for
data). Also, in the condition where we manipulated the me-
diator by making people source aware of effort, the effect
turned off, thus suggesting, in line with Bullock et al. (2010),
that the effects indeed are because of our mediated pro-
cesses.
The findings of this experiment are noteworthy for sev-
eral reasons. First, unlike experiments 1–3, which em-
ployed hedonic target products whose consumption indi-
viduals might feel the need to justify, this study used
donation to charity as a dependent variable. By using this
variable, we ruled out the notion that incentive-focused
people somehow feel a need to justify their actions and
choose to exert effort because it can serve as a justification
for consumption. Second, we measured actual behavior
(donation to charity) in addition to attitudes toward the
target, and we used objective rather than subjective effort.
Thus, the study importantly demonstrated for a first time
that focus has real implications for people’s behaviors and
that those whose focus is on incentive value engage in
more objective effort because they perceive outcomes to
be superior. But effort does not guarantee a superior out-
come in reality, and certainly in our studies it did not. The
outcome that an investment of more effort ensured was
either identical to or inferior to what ease ensured. Thus,
these findings suggest that when people’s focus is on get-
ting the best (experiment 1), as it might be if they see
themselves as deserving and in control of their outcomes
(experiments 2A and 2B), or when something in the en-
vironment makes them feel in control and so turns their
focus on the best (experiments 3 and 4), they end up un-
necessarily overvaluing effortful outcomes. Third, by in-
cluding a condition in which we directed participants’ at-
tention to the source of effort, we found that when effort
does not reflect value, people correct their actions. Im-
portantly, source awareness increased donation among
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TABLE 4
MEDIATED MODERATION: EXPERIMENT 4
Equation Effort Focus
Effort #
focus Attainability
Attainability #
focus Superiority
Superiority #
focus
Overall analysis:
1. Donation .10
(.03)
[.27]
.10
(.03)
[.28]
.13**
(.03)
[3.76]
2. Attainability .33
(.21)
[1.61]
.43*
(.21)
[2.11]
.45*
(.21)
[2.20]
3. Superiority .13
(.12)
[1.06]
.27*
(.12)
[2.24]
.37**
(.11
[3.02]
4. Donation .01
(.04)
[.01]
.35
(.26)
[1.33]
.01
(.04)
[.21]
.16**
(.04)
[4.08]
.01
(.03)
[.08]
.10
(.05)
[1.99]
.06
(.05)
[1.16]
Split analysis, inherent focus:
1. Donation .13*
(.05)
[2.51]
2. Attainability .78**
(.25)
[2.95]
3. Superiority .24
(.23)
[1.04]
4. Donation .12**
(.03)
[3.68]
5. Donation .03
(.06)
[.44]
.12
(.06)
[1.95]
.01
(.06)
[.06]
Split analysis, incentive focus:
1. Donation .14**
(.05)
[2.82]
2. Attainability .12
(.31)
[.39]
3. Superiority .50**
(.11)
[4.68]
4. Donation .25
(.07)
[3.43]**
5. Donation .02
(.07)
[.22]
.13**
(.04)
[3.17]
.17
(.09)
[1.85]
NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses; t-values are in brackets. For overall analysis, n p 36 (excluding “source aware” participants
and conditional on making a donation); Sobel z attainability p 1.94, p ! .05; Sobel z superiority p 1.72, p p .08. For split analysis, inherent
focus, n p 17, Sobel z attainability p 1.69, p p .09. For split analysis, incentive focus, n p 19, Sobel z superiority p 1.72, p p .08. All
equations included constant terms.
p ! .10.
*p ! .05.
**p ! .01.
low-control participants; thus, it was not a cue to ignore
effort.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This article specifies when and why people infer value from
effort, even noninstrumental effort, and when and why ease
conveys value. Ample research had shown that, all things
being equal, people value easy rather than effortful choices
(Dhar 1997; Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Simonson 1989).
Ease is associated with low cost and thus high attainability
of an outcome (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Payne et al. 1993;
Whittlesea 1993). It is also associated with perceived fa-
miliarity and high desirability of an outcome (Bornstein
1989; Lee and Labroo 2004; Schwarz 2004; Winkielman
and Cacioppo 2001). Other research, however, has shown
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that associating effort rather than ease with a choice can
increase preference, for instance, when people are pursuing
important goals (Labroo and Kim 2009a), when they think
they are at a relative advantage compared to others to get
an outcome (Kivetz and Simonson 2003), when they are
looking for special occasion products (Pocheptsova et al.
2011), and when they are trying to assess whether a pro-
motional offer is really among the best they can get (Lo et
al. 2007). In these situations, effort appeared to increase
perceived desirability of an outcome and the exertion of
effort suggested that the outcome must now be attainable.
Taken together, these findings thus suggested that ease can
convey value by increasing perceived attainability and per-
ceived desirability of an outcome, but effort too can convey
value by increasing perceived attainability and perceived
desirability.
To reconcile these mixed findings, we proposed that, al-
though value is always a positive function of judged out-
come attainability and of desirability, value itself may have
two representations and the impact of effort on value de-
pends on the type of value being considered. In particular,
recent findings suggest a distinction between inherent (lik-
ing) and incentive (wanting) value and that general or in-
herent value increases with positive affect whereas incentive
value has more of a motivational basis to it and increases
with negative affect (Berridge 1999; Dai et al. 2008; Win-
kielman and Berridge 2003). For the most part, liking and
wanting are positively correlated, because liking usually is
a precursor to wanting (Dai et al. 2010), but when incentive
value is highlighted, the two may become dissociated (Litt
et al. 2010). We proposed that, if in general positive affect
increases liking, as proposed by other research (Lee and
Labroo 2004; Reber et al. 1998; Schwarz 2004; Wa¨nke et
al. 1997; Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001), then, when peo-
ple are considering the inherent value of an outcome, as-
sociating effort, which is affectively negative (Botvinick et
al. 2009; Luce et al. 1999; Thompson et al. 2009; Payne et
al. 1993), will reduce value by making the outcome appear
less attainable and less desirable. In contrast, if incentive
value is motivationally based (Dai et al. 2010), then when
people are considering whether they want an outcome, as-
sociating effort with the outcome will highlight the moti-
vational meaning of effort. Effort usually is a positive cue
pertaining to motivation: effort makes outcomes appear
more desirable to motivated individuals because motivated
people usually associate effort with the best outcomes (La-
broo and Kim 2009a) and motivated people expect to get
outcomes they put effort into trying to attain and become
optimistic about their chances of attaining those outcomes
(Taylor and Brown 1988). Therefore, among people con-
sidering incentive value and whether it is best, associating
effort to an outcome will make it seem more attainable and
more desirable.
Across five studies, we provided evidence in support of
this framework. We directly manipulated people’s focus on
incentive value (ensuring the best outcomes; experiment 1),
indirectly manipulated focus through people’s perceived
control over the best outcomes (experiments 3 and 4), or
we measured people’s chronic focus on getting the best
outcomes (experiments 2A and 2B). Regardless of whether
framing, situational cues, or chronic focus were used to
highlight incentive value (wanting the best), we found that
incentive-focused people construed effort in line with their
value focus as a positive cue pertaining to outcome attain-
ability and desirability. We obtained our effects with subtle
manipulations in the form of an opportunity to choose one’s
number on a lottery ticket or to infer that one is the first to
set a trend—manipulations that mimic real-world situations
but provide clean tests of theory. Thus, an additional con-
tribution of this research is in showing that outcome con-
trollability may be a valid manipulation of focus on incentive
value.
Across the studies, we also manipulated effort. For sub-
jective effort, we used a blurry rather than clear picture of
a potential date (experiment 2A), a pastel rather than bright
product mock-up (experiment 2B), or a perceptual illusion
of distance in the shelving of a product (experiment 3). For
objective effort, we used store location (experiment 1) or
whether the respondent would have to stretch to make a
donation he was contemplating (experiment 4). Regardless
of our manipulation of focus and effort, the effects were
robust and consistent. Future research should consider other
ways in which objective and subjective effort might be sim-
ilar or different. But an important contribution of this article
is in showing that objective and subjective effort are sim-
ilarly open to interpretation and their influence on perceived
value occurs in a similar manner via the lens people adopt
to construe value. Although some research has shown that
the impact of subjective effort on value depends on how
that effort is interpreted (Labroo and Kim 2009a, 2009b),
objective effort is a much stronger test of pervasiveness of
the phenomenon.
The most important contribution of this research is in
showing process evidence that distinguished between two
key possibilities pertaining to how effort might have an
impact on value: by changing weights on different aspects
of value (attainability and desirability) or based on a dif-
ferent framing of value itself (inherent vs. incentive). The
former hypothesis, which was not favored by us, was that
effort is a negative cue pertaining to attainability (effortful
outcomes are costly to attain) but a positive cue pertaining
to desirability (more important outcomes require effort and
thus are more desirable). Value is always a function of at-
tainability and of desirability, and effort is a simultaneous
cue that makes an outcome less attainable but more desir-
able. Thus, depending on the weight a person puts on at-
tainability versus desirability, effort can have a negative or
positive impact on value. We did not agree with this hy-
pothesis because there is extensive evidence showing that
effort is also a positive cue pertaining to attainability (Taylor
and Brown 1988) and a negative cue pertaining to desira-
bility (Bornstein 1989; Lee and Labroo 2004; Schwarz 2004;
Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001). Thus, for us, the resolution
was in recognizing that value itself must have two represen-
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tations, one in which the negative affect associated with effort
conveys low attainability and low desirability of an outcome,
the other in which the negative affect associated with effort
implies motivational relevance and conveys high attainability
and high desirability of an outcome. Process measures (me-
diated moderation; experiments 3 and 4) provided support
toward this latter premise: highlighting incentive value via a
controllability manipulation resulted in a positive (though
nonsignificant) impact of effort on attainability and a signif-
icant impact on superiority. Evaluations of attainability and
superiority were not correlated (and it did not matter whether
the mediators were measured before or after the dependent
variable), nor did we find any movements in control measures
we collected as a guard against possible alternative accounts,
suggesting that our effects are unlikely to be accounted for
by self-generated validity effects.
Alternative Accounts
Following Winer (1971), a meta-analysis across our five
studies confirmed among the inherent-value focused a pref-
erence for outcomes associated with ease (z p 5.95, p !
.01), but among the incentive focused a preference for out-
comes associated with effort (z p 6.47, p ! .01), showing
that effort alone neither conveys cost or value. Rather, the
decision context that surrounds anticipated effort, and the
inferences people make, determine how effort affects the
value of an outcome. Accounts ranging from a desire to
justify one’s exerted effort, a need to reduce cognitive dis-
sonance for having exerted effort, or the tendency to mis-
takenly fail to recognize effort as a sunk cost are not viable
explanations for our data. That literature is very clear that
justification effects only arise postchoice or after having
exerted effort. For instance, students think that they deserve
better grades because they studied for an exam (effort heu-
ristic; Kruger et al. 2004), consumers evaluate a service
based on waiting time (Yeung and Soman 2007), and people
are more likely to go to the game even if their favorite team
failed to qualify once they buy the ticket (sunk cost effect).
In contrast to those well-documented effects, our research
shows that (some) people infer value from effort even before
exerting it and that subjective effort is similar to anticipated
objective effort. We observed our effects with planned real
effort (experiment 1), prior to engaging in real effort (ex-
periment 4), and with subjective effort (experiments 3, 2A,
and 2B). Also, altering people’s attention to effort led to
correction effects; in the case of justification effects, one
could argue that attention to effort should have further in-
creased justification and value.
Also, in experiment 2A, evaluation of the woman but not
the man was affected based on effort and controllability,
which is in line with our predictions that only people (men)
who see incentive value in an outcome (woman) will infer
added value of the outcome from effort. According to a sunk
cost interpretation, if anything, effort should have similarly
increased both evaluations. Additionally, we found that effort
increased outcome desirability and attainability only under
incentive focus, in line with our theorizing, a moderated effect
not shown in any research on dissonance or sunk cost. Thus,
our contribution also is not in simply showing that whereas
effort heuristic says that the harder people work toward getting
an outcome, the more they value the outcome, we show that
even before people work toward an outcome, they sometimes
prefer an outcome involving more effort. Instead, we show
that anticipated effort can sometimes be a signal of positive
value. And we showed a broad array of situations (social,
consumer, planning, chronic, and situational, with real or sub-
jective effort) that result in value from effort.
Involvement also is unlikely to account for our findings.
In all studies, we measured involvement—target variables
did show movement; this one did not. Also, from a theo-
retical perspective, involvement and outcome controllability
are likely to be orthogonal (affect can increase elaboration,
just as motivation can), and it is not clear a priori whether
high or low controllability would increase involvement or
what predictions might follow were controllability to affect
involvement. Put differently, people could be highly in-
volved or not at all involved when considering inherent
value or when considering incentive value. In any case,
across most of our studies, effort associated with the out-
come, regardless of whether it was objective or subjective,
made the outcome normatively inferior. For instance, a
blurry picture or a product mock-up is worse than a clear
one, and a distant donation box or store is inferior to one
nearby. High-controllability people preferred such out-
comes; if they were highly involved, at a minimum they
should have found the two outcomes equally desirable. Also,
if low control increased involvement, such participants
should not have made evaluations based on their subjective
feelings, preferring subjectively easy outcomes to effortful
ones, and if they were highly involved, it is unclear why
they should correct their evaluations when directed to the
source of effort (experiment 4). However, future research
might investigate whether involvement moderates our ef-
fects; we predict stronger effects among high-involvement
participants such that those who feel high control prefer
effortful products and those who feel low control prefer
easy-to-get products but only if they are engaged in the
choice process. Indeed, such a proposition is consistent with
findings by Labroo et al. (2009) showing that people con-
sider information more important when they associate the
information with effort (vs. ease) to understand but that those
effects especially arise among high-involvement respon-
dents who associate effort with importance more strongly.
Construal level theory (CLT) also does not provide a rea-
sonable alternative account for our data. Even though CLT
can predict that abstract construal will increase focus on de-
sirability, past research does not support the view that effort
rather than ease will always increase desirability (Bornstein
1989; Schwarz 2004). Our argument is that effort will convey
desirability only when people are focused on the best (in-
centive value), and we make this prediction based on self-
perception theory (Bem 1972). It is possible that because an
abstract construal is known to increase goal accessibility (Fu-
jita et al. 2006) and goal accessibility induces an incentive
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focus (Labroo and Kim 2009a), CLT would be able to predict
our effects. But for such an effect, CLT would have to suggest
that value is construed differently, in incentive terms, by those
with abstract construal and inherent terms by those with con-
crete construal. Existing research on CLT to date instead sug-
gests that construal results in differential weights on attain-
ability and desirability but that value always is singular and
represented as inherent value. But our framework would ad-
ditionally suggest that if people with a concrete construal
become incentive focused, effort is likely to increase value
for them as well (or instead). In sum, we would suggest that
either an abstract or a concrete construal can increase the
interpretation of effort as a signal of value. In fact, our model
implies that any factor, such as incremental theory (a belief
that effort results in self improvement; Miele and Molden
2010), optimizer mind-set, or power (a general belief of in-
fluence over other people or situations), that corresponds with
an incentive focus will result in positive evaluations of out-
comes associated with anticipated effort, but because the pos-
itive evaluations will arise from the self-perception process
proposed by our model, anything that shifts focus of these
consumers away from incentive value will also reverse the
effects of effort on evaluation. Future research should test our
model in these contexts.
Implications and Future Research
Our findings also build on Labroo and Kim (2009a). La-
broo and Kim (2009a) focused only on goal pursuit and
only on subjective effort. Instead, here we provide a richer
framework that applies to (a) all kinds of effort, including
real and planned effort, (b) all kinds of situations, social as
well as consumer, and, most importantly, (c) specifies the
process by suggesting that representation of value underlies
a positive or negative impact of effort on evaluation. In
doing so, we integrate the minority of studies showing effort
preference with the majority on effort avoidance to speak
to when and why either effect will hold.
One limitation of the current research is that it does not
distinguish clearly whether our manipulation of inherent
value and incentive value changes a consumer’s frame of
reference (e.g., considering whether the outcome is good or
bad based on its attributes vs. considering whether the out-
come is best against other outcomes on a particular dimen-
sion) or results in a differential reliance on affect versus
motivation. We suggest the former and that a positive affect
increases inherent value but a negative affect increases in-
centive value. Thus, affect influences both incentive value
and inherent value but in different ways because different
meaning is assigned to the affect. But it is possible that
inherent value is purely affective and that incentive value
is purely motivational. In our studies, people considering
inherent value made an affective decision but people con-
sidering incentive value relied on motivation. But this view
would imply that in general decisions are affective (our
inherent value condition often was similar to what a baseline
would look like) but that occasionally people can be guided
into using motivation, which seems unlikely. Instead, it ap-
pears more plausible that in general people consider good-
ness of an alternative based on its attributes (inherent value)
and that a positive affect increases such value but that
whether that alternative is best suited against other alter-
natives (incentive value) and in such situations negative af-
fect conveys motivational relevance. It is also possible that
highlighting motivation could spontaneously change frame
of reference to considering the best (against other alterna-
tives on a certain dimension), whereas highlighting affect
could spontaneously change frame of reference to consid-
ering how good an outcome is (on its own attributes). These
ideas should be tested systematically. Future research should
manipulate liking and wanting in different ways by directly
evoking affective versus motivational concerns and manip-
ulate inherent and incentive frame of reference by evoking
attribute- or alternative-based comparison.
Also important are the marketing, practical, and policy
implications. We show that small but real aspects of our con-
sumption environment—perceived shopping skill, choosing
one’s own lottery number, information framing, inferring
one’s actions will set a trend, or deciding one is in a position
to make an impact—all result in seeing value from effort.
Policy-wise, workaholics who claim a genuine passion for
work abound, and they may be the ones likely to construe
value in incentive terms. Our work cautions that such indi-
viduals might not only be complicating their lives to end up
with objectively worse outcomes but that their incessant quest
of effort could result in dire consequences, from health prob-
lems to regret that one missed out on life’s simpler pleasures.
Future research should also extend our framework to other
domains. For example, other factors, such as mixed emotions
or ambiguity in advertising, that correlate with negative feel-
ings are mostly considered to exert a negative influence on
evaluations, but our research suggests that if our effects are
general to apply to negative feelings, then in situations where
people want the best outcomes, the use of mixed emotion or
ambiguity may exert a favorable impact on evaluation and
choice. All of these premises await future research.
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APPENDIX A
STIMULUS MATERIALS
FIGURE A1
SCENARIOS USED (EXPERIMENT 1)
NOTE.—Color version available as an online enhancement.
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FIGURE A2
SCALES USED IN EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B
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FIGURE A3
PICTURES OF WOMAN (EXPERIMENT 2A) AND PRODUCT MOCK-UP (EXPERIMENT 2B)
NOTE.—In each panel, the left picture is clear and the right picture is blurry. Color version available as an online enhancement.
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APPENDIX B
FIGURE B1
MODEL TESTING MEDIATED MODERATION EFFECT OF EFFORT ON EVALUATION (EXPERIMENT 1)
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.24 on Thu, 7 Aug 2014 22:54:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
734
APPENDIX C
FIGURE C1
STATISTICAL CONDITIONS TEASING APART ATTRIBUTE LEVEL MODEL (A), DECISION WEIGHT MODEL (B),
AND COMBINED MODEL (C) AS UNDERLYING EFFECT OF EFFORT AND FOCUS ON EVALUATION
(EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4)
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FIGURE C2
REQUIRED CONDITIONS FOR EACH MODEL OF FIGURE C1
NOTE.—See Muller et al. (2005, 856).
APPENDIX D
TESTING THE THREE ALTERNATIVE MODELS WITH LISREL
1. AIC is a measure of goodness of fit of a model, and the model with the lowest AIC score is the preferred model. In
our analysis, Model A has the lowest AIC score.
2. In addition, e1 and e2 are not correlated (r p 0.04, NS), so there is no multicollinearity issue among mediators.
Thus, the analysis without the link between e1 and e2 is similar to the one with the link. Here we only report models with
a link between e1 and e2.
3. Models were also run using the separate items comprising attainability, superiority, and evaluation. Details are available
from the corresponding author.
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FIGURE D1
TESTS FOR EXPERIMENT 3
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FIGURE D2
TESTS FOR EXPERIMENT 4
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APPENDIX E
TESTING MODEL A USING MULTIPLE MEDIATOR ANALYSIS
(PREACHER AND HAYES 2008)
FIGURE E1
MULTIPLE MEDIATOR CONFIGURATION
NOTE.—Effort, Focus, Attainability # Focus, and Superiority # Focus were included as covariates but are not depicted in the figure.
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TABLE E1
MULTIPLE MEDIATOR ANALYSIS RESULTS (EXPERIMENT 3)
b SE t p
IV to mediators (a paths):
Attainability (a1) .61 .16 3.89 ! .01
Superiority (a2) .31 .15 2.02 ! .05
Mediators on DV (b paths):
Attainability (b1) .29 .10 2.86 ! .01
Superiority (b2) .47 .10 4.48 ! .01
IV on DV (c paths):
Overall effect (c) .81 .14 5.70 ! .01
Direct effect (c′) .49 .14 3.60 ! .01
Partial effect of control variables on DV:
Effort .11 .13 .84 1 .40
Value focus .26 .59 .44 1 .60
Attainability # Focus .11 .10 1.13 1 .20
Superiority # Focus .01 .10 .05 1 .90
NOTE.—The b paths are for the effect of mediator on the dependent variable
(DV) the controlling independent variable (IV) and the other mediator. Thus, b
paths consider multicollinearity between the two mediators. The c′ path is for the
effect of the IV on the DV controlling the two mediators. Sobel z attainability p
2.30, p ! .05; Sobel z superiority p 1.84, p p .06.
TABLE E2
MULTIPLE MEDIATOR ANALYSIS RESULTS (EXPERIMENT 4)
b SE t p
IV to mediators (a paths):
Attainability (a1) .58 .17 3.44 ! .01
Superiority (a2) .43 .12 3.57 ! .01
Mediators on DV (b paths):
Attainability (b1) .37 .09 4.09 ! .01
Superiority (b2) .22 .11 1.99 p .05
IV on DV (c paths):
Overall effect (c) .33 .10 3.28 ! .01
Direct effect (c′) .02 .10 .21 1 .80
Partial effect of control variables on DV:
Effort .01 .09 .01 1 .90
Value focus .83 .62 1.34 p .20
Attainability # Focus .01 .06 .07 1 .90
Superiority # Focus .15 .13 1.16 1 .20
NOTE.—The b paths are for the effect of mediator on the dependent variable
(DV) the controlling independent variable (IV) and the other mediator. Thus, b
paths consider multicollinearity between the two mediators. The c′ path is for the
effect of the IV on the DV controlling the two mediators. Sobel z attainability p
2.63, p ! .01; Sobel z superiority p 1.74, p p .08.
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APPENDIX F
TABLE F1
MEDIATED MODERATION ANALYSES USING EACH OF THE TWO MEDIATORS INDEPENDENTLY (EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4)
Equation Effort Focus
Effort #
focus Attainability
Attainability #
focus Superiority
Superiority #
focus
Experiment 3:
1. Evaluation .05
(.14)
[.38]
.06
(.14)
[.45]
.87**
(.14)
[6.30]
2. Attainability .26
(.15)
[ 1.72]
.38**
(.15)
[2.57]
.60**
(.15)
[4.01]
3. Evaluation .20
(.15)
[1.33]
.30
(.43)
[.70]
.67**
(.15)
[4.35]
.27*
(.11)
[2.32]
.14
(.12)
[1.15]
4. Superiority .18
(.16)
[1.14]
.04
(.15)
[0.25]
.39*
(.16)
[2.47]
5. Evaluation .02
(.12)
[.19]
.03
(.50)
[.06]
.69
*(.13)
[5.48]
.47*
(.11)
[4.22]
.01
(.11)
[.15]
Experiment 4:
1. Donation .01
(.04)
[.27]
.01
(.04)
[.28]
.13*
(.04)
[3.76]
2. Attainability .33
(.21)[
1.62]
.43*
(.21)
[2.11]
.45*
(.21)
[2.20]
3. Donation .04
(.03)
[1.23]
.02
(.12)
[.15]
.09*
(.04)
[2.54]
.10*
(.03)
[3.52]
.01
(.03)
[.15]
4. Superiority .13
(.12)
[1.07]
.27*
(.12)
[2.24]
.37**
(.11)
[3.36]
5. Donation .03
(.05)
[.73]
.37
(.30)
[1.21]
.08
(.04)
[1.82]
.12 *
(.06)
[1.89]
.07
(.06)
[1.18]
NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses; t-values are in brackets. Items not marked with a significance symbol are not significant. For
experiment 3, np 60, Sobel z attainabilityp 2.09, p ! .05; Sobel z superiorityp 2.12, p ! .05. For experiment 4, np 36, Sobel z attainability
p 1.87, p ! .06; Sobel z superiority p 1.71, p p .08. All equations included constant terms. This analysis shows that each mediator (level of
attainability and level of superiority) independently provides mediated moderation.
p ! .10.
*p ! .05.
**p ! .01.
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